DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE: AN EMERGING
CUSTOMARY NORM?
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‘A great principle is spreading across the world like wildfire. That principle, as we all know,
is the revolutionary idea that the people, not governments, are sovereign. This principle has, in
(the last) decade, . . . acquired the force of historical necessity . . . Democracy today is
synonymous with legitimacy the world over; it is, in short, the universal value of our time.’1

INTRODUCTION
International law has traditionally regarded the peoples of the world as being represented
in the international arena by the governments in de facto control of their respective states.
Except where such governments are imposed by foreign invasion or conduct themselves
in ways inimical to international peace and security, these governments are conventionally
deemed worthy of respect and protection under international law - in particular, respect
regarding ‘matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction’2 and protection
‘from the threat or use of force’.3 The method by which a government of domestic origin
achieves or retains power was not ordinarily thought of as a basis for withholding such
protection. As US Chief Justice Taft ruled in the Tinoco Arbitration, 4 the domestic
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constitutionality of the seizure of power is considered beyond the scope of international
concern:

‘The issue is not whether the new government assumes power or conducts its administration
under constitutional limitations established by the people during the incumbency of the
government it has overthrown. The question is, has it really established itself in such a way
that all within its influence recognise its control, and that there is no opposing force assuming
to be a government in its place? Is it discharging its functions as a government within its own
jurisdiction?’5

Four decades later, amidst the creation of the United Nations and its provisions trumpeting
the right of citizenry to participation and the protection of this right by international law,
the principle still held sway and was to hold sway way into the future. In 1961, Professor
Hans Kelsen restated the principle as follows:

‘Under what circumstances does a national legal order begin or cease to be valid? The answer,
given by international law, is that a national legal order begins to be valid as soon as it has
become - on the whole - efficacious; and it ceases to be valid as soon as it loses this efficacy
…The Government brought into permanent power by a revolution or coup d’etat is, according
to international law, the legitimate government of the state, whose identity is not affected by
these events.’6
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During the Cold War, it was nearly impossible for the international community as a whole
to agree both that a particular state was undemocratic and that international action should
be taken against that state. The single exception concerned the process of decolonisation.
A consensus gradually developed within the United Nations that the denial of majority
self-rule in the colonial territories of Africa and Asia should be treated as an international
delict.7 When white minority regimes in South Africa and elsewhere resisted the transition
to majority rule, states could agree, within the context of the United Nations system, to
apply economic and diplomatic sanctions. 8 By defining apartheid regimes as per se
violative of international law, 9 states could treat the character of the white minority
governments as a legitimate subject for international action, without exposing all
undemocratic regimes to similar scrutiny and pressure.

It is significant that in the case of South African diplomatic credentials were denied on the
basis of the internal character of the regime. Through its de jure violations of one of the
Charter of the United Nation’s few unambiguous and broadly supported norms of racial
equality, the South African Government subjected itself to ever-increasing scrutiny and
disapproval from the General Assembly, embodied in innumerable resolutions, including
refusals to take action on credentials. These measures culminated in the passage by the
General Assembly of a resolution declaring that the South African regime had no right to
represent the people of South Africa and that the liberation movements recognized by the
Organisation of African Unity were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming
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majority of the South African people.10 The resolution went on to request all specialized
agencies and other intergovernmental organisations to deny membership or privileges of
membership to the South African regime and to invite, in consultation with the
Organisation of African Unity, representatives of the liberation movements of the South
African people recognized by the organisation to participate in their meetings. 11 The
general consensus regarding the illegality of the South African regime was an exception
as the history of United Nations credentials controversies in the Cold War era attests. It is
instructive that the international community’s views in this era regarding regime
legitimacy were generally permissive and often international recognition of governments
favoured the government (whether legitimate or illegitimate) in effective power rather
than some seemingly legitimate putative authority.12 This was notwithstanding General
Assembly passed Resolution 396, passed shortly after the United Nations was created.
This Resolution states clearly that:

‘whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a
Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in
the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the Purposes and
Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case’13
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Though the idea that the international community can protect human rights was one of the
great practical achievements manifested in the Charter of the United Nations with
international law at the vanguard of giving tangible expression to the rights, the Cold War
tied the issue to ideological and revolutionary agendas. ‘Common interest’ and ‘common
good’ were seen as nothing more than a diplomatic screen hiding the avaricious and
predatory aims of the imperialist Powers.14 The effect of this position was to strengthen
sovereignty considerations as the United Nations became a ground for cultivating the
agenda of nationalism brought to the fore with the appearance of the ‘Third World’ as a
force in the years after World War II. Realpolitik not law was the governing force in the
Cold War era with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations frozen
on paper and rarely seen in practice.

The end of the Cold War, which paralysed the United Nations from its inception, was a
cause for celebration and hope. In the early 1990s, Western leaders congratulated
themselves over the end of communism and the fall of the Soviet empire. Following the
historic Security Council Summit Meeting of January 1992, the then Secretary-General of
the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, spoke of a growing conviction ‘among
nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great
objectives of the Charter of the United Nations - a United Nations capable of maintaining
international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in
the words of the Charter of the United Nations, “social progress and better standards of
life in larger freedom”.’15
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New challenges arising from the strengthening of international human rights norms and
the seemingly unprecedented spirit of international cooperation accompanied the end of
bipolar geostrategic and ideological confrontation. The end of the Cold War witnessed a
dramatic increase in the number, diversity and proportion of states formally committed to
democratic principles.16 Many states also displayed a greater willingness to countenance
foreign intervention in the name of democracy and human rights. 17 On the one hand,
liberal-democratic political values increased immensely in prestige in the wake of the
collapse of the Communist Party states of Eastern Europe. 18 On the other hand,
dictatorships that, for political or geostrategic reasons, were once able to count on an
automatic constituency on one or the other side of the bipolar divide suddenly found
themselves vulnerable to broad international disapprobation. Whereas coups d’etat and
rigged elections in the Cold War era were considered business-as-usual, they were now
candidates for concerted international response, not implausibly extending as far as
internationally sanctioned armed intervention.19 But in many respects, the rhetoric in this
area outpaced reality. Although various forms of intervention to promote democracy may
be more politically palatable than in the past,20 a broadly accepted content of democracy is
yet to emerge.
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In the early days of the post-Cold War era, prominent international law scholars were
emphatic that representative government was an emerging international legal
entitlement.21 International civil servants joined the mounting chorus proclaiming a newshared consensus that democracy, human rights, and peace are inextricably linked. With
routine announcements by Heads of state of their fealty to democratic norms, and
insistence that leaders of other states do so as well, democracy was finally at the heart of
the international agenda. 22 International organisations passed numerous resolutions
announcing that governmental legitimacy rests on the consent of the governed, and
conditioned membership in their organisations on acceptance of democratic principles.23
Even developing countries, once near monolithic in their opposition to any external
involvement in domestic politics, began to commonly seek international legitimacy
through external monitoring and even supervision of their electoral processes.24 While the
mantra ‘democracy is an idea whose time has come’ was loudly trumpeted in the last
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decade of the 20th century, the content of democracy - its criteria and benchmarks - still
remains bogged down in a quagmire of political and human rights discourse.

Though states are increasingly willing to embrace democratic ideals, the precise
understanding of democracy continues to languish in uncertainty. The uncertainties are no
surprise. The international community has long paid lip service to basic principles of
democratic governance but it has proven extremely difficult to translate this agreement on
basic principles into a consensus on the content of democracy. In part, this is because at
the global level the principles at issue have been stated at a high level of generality - high
enough to mask important substantive differences among states on the content of those
principles.

‘As a result, large numbers of states have been able to sign on to international instruments
proclaiming support for democracy and associated values, without any real agreement on the
meaning of democracy or the means by which it should be given effect. Such differences
among states surface when concrete measures are contemplated in specific cases.’25

Even when states agree on the kinds of changes necessary to initiate or restore democracy
in a particular country, they may disagree sharply on the role the international community
should play in seeking such changes. Such differences reflect strong philosophical and
political differences over the extent to which external actors may legitimately seek
changes in the domestic politics of other states. In practice, therefore, cases in which
broad international agreement on measures to be taken against undemocratic regimes can
be achieved are the exception rather than the rule.
25
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Democratic entitlement as a universal human right is a complex and multifaceted issue.
The Article has as its modest aim a general reflection on the enshrinement of democracy
as a universal entitlement and the movement of international law in a pro-democratic
direction The Article will seek to highlight the general uncertainties that continue to
plague the democratic entitlement. The Article deliberately focuses on the United Nations
system with reference also being given to regional efforts. The Article does not discuss
the legal justifications and nature of measures to address undemocratic regimes. While
such measures are significant in pro-democratic discourse, it is beyond the scope of the
Article’s general aim of exposing the thorny issues that surround democratic entitlement
as a universal right.

GRAPPLING WITH THE DEMOCRACY QUESTION
Within the United Nations system, broad statements in support of democratic governance
date back to 1948, when the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights by consensus. 26 A number of articles in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights substantiate provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the rights of
the citizenry in member states. Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations
contain specific provisions in this respect. Article 55(c) of the Charter of the United
Nations commits the Organisation to the promotion of ‘universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion’.27 Under Article 56, ‘All Members pledge themselves to
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organisation for the achievement of
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the purposes set forth in Article 55’. 28 Although falling far short of authorizing
intervention, unilateral or multilateral, to compel compliance with human rights standards,
these provisions do make clear that the pursuit of human rights does not, as such,
constitute intervention ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction’29
under Article 2(7).

The United Nations has promulgated instruments that are collectively equivalent to an
International Bill of Rights30 and helped gather international consensus for the idea that
the populations of States have rights under international law. This extends to the
protection of the rights, even against the government. Beginning with the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has
constructed a normative framework for the realisation of rights for the people. 31 The
framework has been sustained over time by the actions of States in signing and ratifying
various international human rights and related instruments, some of which are now part of
customary international law. The international collaborative efforts involving United
Nations organs, human rights workers and others have helped publicise the plight of the
oppressed millions who yearn for more personal liberties and freedom from arbitrary
detention, execution and political purges.

Among the human rights deemed fit objects of international concern is the right of
political participation. This right was embodied in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights as follows:
28
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‘1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.’32

Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘the will of the people
shall be the basis of the authority of government,’ and that ‘this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections’. 33 Implicitly, then, Article 21 links governmental
legitimacy to respect for the popular will. But this linkage does not appear in the
subsequent, and legally binding, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(‘ICCPR’).34 Article 25 of the ICCPR speaks of the right to participate in public affairs,
including the right to genuine and periodic elections, but it does not purport to condition
governmental authority on respect for the will of the people.35 The language of Article 25
was intentionally drafted broadly enough to accommodate the wide range of governmental
systems in place among the initial parties to the ICCPR.36 As a result, even Soviet-bloc
states felt free to ratify the ICCPR.37 From their perspective, communist states satisfied
the requirements of Article 25 by affording voters access to various participatory
mechanisms as well as an opportunity to ratify their leadership in periodic, albeit single-
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party, elections. 38 Thus, the cost of consensus was language broad enough to obscure
sharp differences among states on the nature of their commitment to democratic rule.

The differences between the two articulations in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and ICCPR are interesting. As Professor Henry Steiner notes, the:

‘earlier instrument, influenced to a greater degree than the International Covenant by the
tradition of liberal democracy, gives more emphasis to the role of the “will of the people” as
the “basis of the authority of government”.’ 39

‘The main ideological competitors of liberal democracy, adherents of one variant or another
of Leninist vanguardism, did not, after all, deny the role of popular will as the basis of
governmental authority; the often-used terms “people’s democracy” and “socialist
democracy” were affirmations of fidelity to this notion, the revolutionary struggle being the
ultimate embodiment of the popular will.’40

Roth states:
‘The Declaration’s version is more threatening to non-liberal approaches because it contains,
at least arguably, an unwelcome nexus between elections and governmental authority.’41

and explains that:

‘Article 21 of the Declaration can be read syllogistically to mean that the basis of
governmental authority is such popular will as has been expressed in the elections, whereas
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non-liberal regimes would prefer it to mean that the popular will is (in some abstract sense)
the basis of - and therefore expressed by - governmental authority, and is also expressed in
elections. The Covenant version simplifies the matter by leaving undefined the relationship, if
any, not only between authority and elections, but also between authority and participation.’42

Tragically, outside of the decolonisation context, during the Cold War era, there was little
international consensus on the requirements of democratic governance beyond the general
but limited insistence on periodic and genuine elections found in the ICCPR and a number
of other international legal instruments. As a result, states lacked generally accepted
criteria by which to judge other states’ compliance with substantive democratic
principles.43 With the end of the bi-polar ideological competition that characterized the
Cold War, 44 there has been a widely publicized shift in the character of public
pronouncements about democracy. More states have made, through treaty or by means of
non-binding but still influential declarations, formal commitments to democratic
governance.45 In addition, states, international organisations, human rights tribunals and
legal scholars have sought increasingly to imbue that commitment with some real content
to move beyond the simple but vague commitment to free elections contained in the
ICCPR.46
42
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The democracy discourse however remains ‘straitjacketed’ by Article 2(7) of the Charter
of the United Nations which prohibits intervention in the “domestic affairs” of other
states. This Article remains a pillar of the Charter of the United Nations system and
continues to cast a shadow over all debates relating to government legitimacy or
illegitimacy. Accordingly, although many states have joined the promulgation of
resolutions and declarations proclaiming support for democracy and the right of political
participation,47 they also stress that each state has the ‘sovereign right freely to choose and
develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems, whether or not they conform
to the preferences of other states’. 48 Though the international community may, under
Articles 55 and 56, promote state observance of the right of citizens to participate in their
governance, there is no clear authority to mandate a particular allocation of decisionmaking power within a sovereign state. In any event, an election’s ‘genuineness’ as
referred to by both participation provisions, has no obvious criteria.

In a bid to give the participation provisions content and contour, in December 1988, the
General Assembly called on the United Nations Human Rights Commission ‘to consider
appropriate ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic
and genuine elections,’ albeit ‘in the context of full respect for the sovereignty of Member
States’.49 The result adopted by the Economic and Social Council in May 1989 was a
‘framework for future efforts,’ the first heading of which was: ‘The will of the people
expressed through periodic and genuine elections as the basis for the authority of
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government’,50 a phrase that clears up the above-mentioned ambiguity in Article 21 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The document included mention of ‘the right of
citizens of a State to change their governmental system through appropriate constitutional
means’, and ‘the right of candidates to put forward their political views, individually and
in cooperation with others’, and the need for ‘independent supervision’ of elections.51
Two years later, the General Assembly, with only eight dissenting votes, declared:

‘that determining the will of the people requires an electoral process that provides an equal
opportunity for all citizens to become candidates and put forward their political views,
individually and in co-operation with others’. 52

It nonetheless immediately added the words, ‘as provided in national constitutions and
laws’53 and further recognized:

‘that the efforts of the international community to enhance the effectiveness of the principle of
periodic and genuine elections shall not call into question each State’s sovereign right freely
to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems, whether or not they
conform to the preferences of other states.’54

The net result, albeit limited, is a strengthening of the participation norm. More
concretely, as a result of agreements among contending forces, the UN became involved
50
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in election monitoring in member states including Haiti, Namibia, Nicaragua, Angola and
Cambodia. In a sign that the United Nations was moving towards granting the concept of
democracy content and contour, the mandate accorded the observer mission in the
Nicaraguan case included:

‘(a) To verify that political parties are equitably represented in the Supreme Electoral Council
and its subsidiary bodies (nine regional electoral councils and 4,100 electoral boards).
(b) To verify that political parties enjoy complete freedom of organisation and mobilization,
without hindrance or intimidation by anyone.
(c) To verify that all political parties have equitable access to State television and radio in
terms of both the timing and the length of broadcasts.
(d) To verify that electoral rolls are properly drawn up.’55

Thus, far from merely verifying the honesty of the vote count, the United Nations mission
in Nicaragua undertook to oversee intricate details not only of the electoral mechanism
but of the contextual conditions. Although the United Nations presence came at the
request of a sovereign government, and could not have been imposed in ordinary
circumstances even under a permissive reading of Article 2(7), activities of this nature
cannot but identify the United Nations with evolving norms of electoral legitimacy.

In yet another significant move in the early days of the post-Cold War era, support for
democracy became increasingly identified with the maintenance of peace and security.
The reaction to the 29 September 1991 Haitian coup seemed to evidence that the norm of
popular participation was coming into its own as an international index of governmental
legitimacy, at least where the international community has already become enmeshed
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The Situation in Central America: Threats to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiative. GA
Res 44/10, UN GAOR, 44th sess, Annex I, Agenda Item 34, Appendix at 3 UN Doc A/44/375 (1989).
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(through the ‘observer’ function) in domestic processes. Resolution 917 declared that the
obstruction of the restoration of democracy in Haiti constituted a threat to peace.56 By
imposing sanctions and authorizing military intervention in order to restore democratic
rule in Haiti, the Security Council further recognized democracy as an entitlement. The
Security Council corroborated the claim of a population’s right to be governed by those
whom they had elected freely, fairly and openly. On the adoption of Resolution 940,57 US
Representative to the United Nations Madeleine K. Albright stated that the resolution’s
objective was ‘not to impinge upon the sovereignty of Haiti, but to restore the power to
exercise that sovereignty to those who rightfully possessed it and to enable Haiti’, in the
words of the Charter of the United Nations, to pursue ‘social progress and better standards
of life in larger freedom’. 58 This echoed the sentiments that had been aired earlier by
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations at the historic
Security Council Summit Meeting of January 1992.59

The UN sanctioned pro-democratic intervention in Haiti was part of the UN’s move to
assume and implement a bold new agenda - the promotion of democracy and the
connection between a democratic form of government and protection of human rights.
‘Demands for democratic participation encouraged international involvement, which in
turn facilitated democratic elections, resulting in international legitimacy for UN election
monitoring.’60 The popular claim to free and fair elections brought dramatic changes of
government in diverse nations around the globe. This demand for participatory rights
56
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17

created international pressure on governments to turn to various international entities
especially the UN to bolster their democratic credentials through endorsement of their
domestic elections by external electoral monitors.61

Election monitoring by the UN in independent nations signalled the start of a new foray
by the UN. UN-monitored elections became one of the most visible manifestations of the
right of peoples under international law to a democratic form of government. 62
Governments’ recognition that their legitimacy depends on meeting a normative
expectation of the community of states’63 indicated that the norm was undergoing a period
of definition and realization.

The 1990s witnessed a number of exciting new developments in the UN as it sought to
match its democratic rhetoric with the necessary normative and institutional framework.
In November 1991, the Secretary-General’s guidelines on elections monitoring were
released. 64 In 1992, the General Assembly welcomed the Secretary-General’s plan to
establish both a focal point and an Electoral Assistance Unit within the Secretariat, and to
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establish two trust funds for electoral work.65 The Electoral Assistance Unit came into
being in 1992.66 The office became a Division in 1994, and is now located within the
Department of Political Affairs. 67 In 1993, the General Assembly placed electoral
assistance in the context of democracy promotion by including language on ensuring ‘the
continuation and consolidation of the democratization process’ in the body of the
resolution.68 This resolution also addressed some of the practical concerns emerging from
the United Nations’ new work in the field.69 In 1994, the General Assembly’s resolution
supporting electoral work linked human rights work and democratization. In 1995, the
General Assembly passed its standard electoral assistance resolution, with the term
‘democratization’ in its title.70

In 1998, about a decade after the General Assembly had flagged a new role for the UN in
seeking to uphold participatory rights of peoples,71 the UN again passed two resolutions.
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The sovereignty resolution remained substantively the same as previous resolutions72 but
the electoral assistance resolution was broader a sign that this aspect of UN involvement
in the democratic crusade was coming of age. 73 Despite important developments, a
bifurcated development continues to persist between the need to enforce democracy as a
universal norm and the need to guarantee sovereignty of States. This bifurcation opens up
an avenue for States with concern about shielding their internal policies from UN scrutiny
especially so in view of the anxiety that the democratic crusade generates among many
non-Western nations.

DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN PRO-DEMOCRATIC DIRECTION
The idea of democracy is supported by fundamental instruments of multilateralism. The
Charter of the United Nations under Chapter I, art 1(2), provides that ‘the Purposes of the
United Nations are . . . to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’. 74 Other important
instruments articulating this right are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states:

‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.’75
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The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provide that: ‘All peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development’. 76 Professor
Thomas Franck argues that these documents together with regional instruments constitute
‘a net of participatory entitlements’.77 Commentators note that the right to democracy has
developed within international agreements. Professor Thomas Franck finds that
democracy, ‘while not yet fully word made law, is rapidly becoming in our time, a
normative rule of the international system’.78 On his part, Gregory Fox asserts that ‘parties
to the major human rights conventions have created an international law of participatory
rights’.79

The assertion that the principle of democracy and the rights which together constitute the
democratic prerogative are ‘guaranteed in all comprehensive human rights instruments’80
is not empty rhetoric. Infact the greatest progress in specifying the elements of democratic
governance has been made in regional systems and, in particular, within the OSCE.81 At a
1990 meeting in Copenhagen, for example, members of the OSCE (then referred to as the
CSCE) spelled out some of the characteristics of democratic systems and the rule of law.82
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This list included: 1) free elections; 2) the need for representative government; 3)
accountability of the executive to an elected legislature or the electorate as a whole; 4) a
clear separation between the State and political parties; 5) an independent judiciary; 6)
military and police forces under civilian control; and 7) a panoply of related human
rights.83

Importantly, in addition to guaranteeing democratic freedoms to the individual, recent
instruments view democracy as both a keystone of human rights and a necessary condition
for international peace and security. Reflecting the proliferation of democracies
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Document of Copenhagen84 commits participating
states to the individual freedoms of democracy, including free elections, representative
government, government compliance with law and separation between the State and
political parties. The CSCE’s Charter of Paris 85 pledges to ‘undertake to build,
consolidate, and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our
nations’.86 In addition to guaranteeing democratic freedoms to every individual, the thirtyfour participating states proclaimed: ‘Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of
expression, tolerance of all groups of society, and equality of opportunity for each
person’. 87 In the Moscow meeting of the CSCE, participating states asserted that ‘full
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respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the development of societies
based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law are prerequisites for a lasting order of
peace, security, justice and co-operation in Europe’. 88 Participating states found that
‘issues relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law are
of international concern, as respect for these rights and freedoms constitutes one of the
foundations of the international order’.89

International conferences in the 1990s mirrored the CSCE’s concerns. The Vienna
Declaration90 of the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights ‘considers the
denial of the right of self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the
importance of the effective realization of this right’.91 The participating states expressly
defined self-determination to include a democratic entitlement, noting that it is through
self-determination that peoples ‘freely determine their political status, and freely pursue
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their economic, social and cultural development’. 92 The Vienna Declaration further
affirmed that the ‘World Conference on Human Rights considers the denial of the right of
self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the importance of the
effective realization of this right’. 93 The participating states asserted that ‘democracy,
development and respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms are interdependent
and mutually reinforcing’. Finally, the participating states agreed that ‘democracy is based
on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, economic,
social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives’.94

Regional initiatives together with the United Nations monitoring of elections have
clarified the substantive meaning of the emerging right to democracy.95 Gregory Fox lists
criteria gathered from human rights instruments and United Nations practice in
monitoring elections that define a free and fair election. These include:

‘1. periodic elections at reasonable intervals;
2. a secret ballot;
3. honesty in vote tabulation;
4. universal suffrage, with minor exceptions permitted for minors, prisoners, the mentally ill,
and the like;
92
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5. an absence of discrimination against voters and candidates;
6. freedom to organise and join political parties, which must be given equal access to the
ballot, and an equal opportunity to campaign;
7. to the extent the government controls the media, the right of all parties to present their
views through the major media outlets;
8. supervision of the election by an independent council or commission not tied to any party,
faction, or individual, whose impartiality is insured in both law and practice.’96

Policy trends of actors in the world community have further encouraged democracy as a
right. 97 The United Nations has monitored over thirty elections, including those in
Namibia, Nicaragua and Haiti. 98 Several Western European nations have attempted to
withhold aid from those nations that are not democracies. On a regional level, the
European Community and the United States have imposed on countries, such as the
former Yugoslavia and the Balkan States, ‘conditions on recognition’ that include a
commitment to democratic governance.99 Additionally, restoration of democracy and the
right of self-determination has figured prominently in the lawfulness of military action in
the southern hemisphere. Today, many countries notably in the Third World consider a
clean bill of health from foreign electoral observers as an important aspect of
demonstrating their commitment and adherence to democratic ideals.
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The biggest stumbling block though in the move towards democracy as an entitlement is
that both within the United Nations and regional organisations there is no special set of
institutional procedures for handling interruptions in democratic governance, much less
for addressing undemocratic regimes generally. As a result, any effort to promote
democracy through the political organs of the United Nations is subject to all the vagaries
of United Nations politics. The procedures within regional organisations are little better.
The Moscow and Copenhagen documents commit the member states, morally if not
legally, to ‘defend and protect’ the ‘democratic order’ in any participating state against a
violent overthrow.100 But the steps to be taken are not specified, not even to the extent of
outlining the institutional procedures to be followed to determine what those steps should
be. Although one author has argued that the Copenhagen Document implicitly authorizes
military intervention to protect democracy,101 it seems unlikely that the signatories would
interpret it this way.

Despite acknowledgment of democracy as an entitlement there exist minimal international
and regional procedures for responding to unconstitutional seizures of power and flawed
elections. Steps to be taken are not specified with regional and international efforts
constrained by the non-intervention provisions of the Charter of the United Nations102 and
continued opposition of states to anything that might open the door too widely to
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intervention in internal affairs. There is simply no consensus, within regional and other
international organisations, on strengthening significantly their institutional capacity to
promote democracy. Any substantial departure from present practice must survive the
critical scrutiny of veto-wielding states such as China and Russia103 as well as potentially
hostile regional blocs in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. As a result of differences
among states, departures from democratic principles are likely to prompt a significant
collective international response only in exceptional circumstances. On rare occasions, as
in Haiti, it may prove possible for states to agree on collective measures to restore the
ousted government to power,104 but in general, easy cases of the sort represented by Haiti
continue to be very few and far between.

CONCLUSION
The normative basis for the right to democracy is discerned in the historical development
of human rights law. There is a persuasive case to be made for a democratic tradition in
international law.

‘Even the strongest critics of democracy are not denying the value of the concept, but rather
they are cautious about accepting it blindly and ignoring the consequences and other
potentially valid ideological perspectives.’105
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The Universal Declaration on Human Rights is the premier instrument on the right to
democracy, and it contains the clearest statement on the issue of democracy. 106 While
General Assembly resolutions are often regarded as not binding,107 it must be noted that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not just another General Assembly
Resolution. ‘It has become an edifying referent for state constitutions, whose contents
sometimes are a wholesale adoption of provisions of the Universal Declaration.’ 108
Beyond state boundaries, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has inspired
regional and international agreements.109 The influence of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights on subsequent international and regional developments regarding
democratic governance is testament that it has effectively shed whatever stigma attended
the circumstances of its birth. The eminence of the declaration is evident in its
endorsement as a reflection of customary international law.110 In fact the UN observes that
the broadest legally binding human rights agreements, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 111 and the International Covenant on Civil and
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Political Rights112, have ‘take[n] the provisions of the Universal Declaration a step further
by making them binding upon States parties’.113

Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasises the overriding
importance of the will of the people.114 Therefore, a government that is not based on the
consent of the governed is not democratic. In addition, the government must be
substantially representative of all distinct groups in the country. It follows that
representation should be manifest in active as opposed to nominal participation such that
‘representation and participation (are) experienced as part of a continuum’. 115 To be
legitimate and democratic in international law, the emerging government must be based
on the consent of the people and must be participatorily representative of all national and
distinct political groups in the country.

There has been relatively broad (though by no means uniform) acceptance of the principle
that elections should entail competition among multiple political parties - something
Soviet-bloc states rejected for years.116 Additionally, substantial international agreement
now exists on many of the procedural and substantive prerequisites for free and fair
elections.117
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Such prerequisites include near-universal adult suffrage, the right to vote in secret and to have one’s
vote counted equally with that of others, the right to campaign, to form political parties, to express
political opinions without interference, to seek and receive information, to have reasonable access to
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‘Elections, however, are only part of any democratic system. They may assist in the formation
of a government responsive to the popular will, but they do not guarantee such a government.
In many countries, systemic problems override the positive effects of free elections. In a
number of Latin American states, for example, entrenched militaries, powerful business elites,
lopsided patterns of resource distribution, and a history of human rights abuses all sharply
constrain the ability of elected governments to alter existing political relations’.118

In some countries, in Europe and elsewhere, the problem is just the opposite: elections
result in governments that are too responsive to the popular will of an ethnic majority, and
insufficiently attentive, or openly hostile to, minority group interests. 119 In still other
countries, elected governments abandon democratic principles after attaining office. 120
Acceptance and entrenchment of democracy involves the infusion of democratic social
organization in key state mechanisms besides the current over reliance on formal
procedural democratic processes as the benchmark. Concern with furthering democracy
requires going beyond the procedural motions of democracy, such as universal suffrage, to
the realization of democracy in substance. While formal mechanisms may constitute
necessary components of a democratic society, they fall far short of being sufficient in
achieving the substance of democracy.

For all the discourse surrounding the notion of democratic governance, there is as yet no
broad consensus about what the notion means, what the content of it is and whether it
exists as a basic legal entitlement for the citizenry necessitating enforcement (by whatever
means available) by the international community. Naturally states are skeptical about
118
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recognizing that international law has fully recognized and incorporated an allencompassing notion of democracy. This is especially so in view of the fact that
conceptions of democracy developed by way of treaties and General Assembly
Resolutions are notably open ended, part of the legacy of the Cold War polarization of
democratic forms with both East and West claiming democracy, but sharply differing on
ideological and substantive grounds. The end of the Cold War saw the ascendance of
liberal democracy as the basis of a new world order but this ascendance is seen as
strengthening a restrictive practice of democracy and threatening to the recognition of
democratic heterogeneity. The developing world is especially wary of the new world
order democratic discourse which is seen as promoting a conservative and protective form
of liberal democracy hostile to the evolution of other popular and participatory democratic
processes and thus part of a subtle Western expansionist agenda.

Though at both the international and regional level democracy has been recognised as an
international norm, support for democracy is still expressed in general terms with no
clear-cut international consensus existing as to the criteria that should be used to judge
whether or not a particular government is substantively ‘democratic’.121 In part, this is
because many states still do not share the West’s enthusiasm for liberal, parliamentary
democracy. Some states, in particular Islamic and Asian states, view much of the recent
rhetoric about democratic governance as a misplaced attempt to transplant western
institutions and structures of governance to countries with radically different cultural and
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political traditions. 122 In their view, any attempt to impose a western blueprint for
democracy constitutes nothing short of cultural imperialism.123

Even within regional systems with a relatively strong commitment to democratic
government, evaluation of actual cases may prove very difficult. 124 The problem is
particularly acute in the case of new or emerging democracies attempting to overcome a
long legacy of authoritarian mismanagement in a climate of economic decline and
political instability.125 In the states of the former Soviet Union, for example, it is relatively
easy to make judgments about whether national elections have been fairly conducted.126
Even when states can agree on the character of a particular state’s government, they may
disagree strongly on the approach the international community should take to dealing with
that government.127 Many states remain firmly convinced that the character of a state’s
government is fundamentally a matter of domestic concern. 128 Some states, however,
acknowledge that democratic governance has become a subject of international
122
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commitments and therefore of international concern, but believe strongly that change
should be effected through dialogue and negotiation rather than through any other more
pragmatic measures.129
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